Aero & Space Cybersecurity Market & Threat Intelligence
We’re thrilled to welcome Juliette Bignon, our new intern, in our CyberInflight’s team this week
She will help us for 5 months on our market intelligence studies. Juliette has an International Relations Master’s Degree from the Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, specialized in International Risks Expertise
Welcome Juliette!
Belspo, as part of the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, organized a panel on “Cyber Resilience in Space Workshop: Mapping Challenges, Forging Resilience”.
Two main things to remember from these 2 conferences :
– The imminent establishment of the EU Space ISAC
and
– The future publication EU Space Law which will support the resilience of our ecosystem
Nous sommes fiers d’annoncer que l’article de Matthias POPOFF, Market Analyst chez CyberInflight, intitulé “Cybersécurité Spatiale: Principes clés de l’intersection des domaines cyber et spatial” a été publié dans le magazine Space International n°3
Nous sommes ravis de partager la tribune « Parole d’Expert » de Matthias POPOFF, analyste marché chez CyberInflight, publié par le CyberCercle.
Les enjeux majeurs en matière de cybersécurité appliquée au spatial y sont présentés, un sujet d’une importance capitale à une époque où la technologie et l’espace sont de plus en plus interconnectés.
Au programme :
– La jonction du cyber et du spatial au carrefour des compétences
– Le spatial à l’épreuve de la guerre en Ukraine
– L’état de l’art de la cybersécurité spatiale
– La place du cyberspatial dans la conduite des opérations
L’article est consultable sur: https://cybercercle.com/paroledexpert-matthias-popoff-cyberinflight-08092023/
#Cybersécurité #Espace #Technologie #Satellite #ParoleDExpert #Cybercercle
Quelques photos de la visite de notre CEO Florent Rizzo dans les locaux du Space ISAC à Colorado Springs.
Le Space ISAC est hébergé au sein du National Cybersecurity Center (NCC).
Merci à l’équipe du Space ISAC pour leur accueil et aux experts présents dans leur Watch Center.
Florent Rizzo a également eu la chance d’être présent le jour de la visite du sénateur John Hickenlooper qui est venu visiter les locaux du Space ISAC pour évoquer les enjeux de cybersécurité des PMEs ainsi que la difficulté de formation des experts en cyber… Beaucoup de parallèles ont été fait avec l’Europe, et notamment le RGPD/GDPR Européen a été cité à maintes reprises comme une référence.
Un grand merci au Space ISAC pour leur confiance et leur accueil
#space #cybersecurity #cyberinflight #isac
La Defcon et son Aerospace Village : un évènement exceptionnel !
Notre CEO Florent Rizzo a assisté ce DEFCON 31 à Las Vegas
Une petite synthèse en photos avant un debrief plus complet :
– Interview de Chris Roberts : la “légende” repentie du hacking dans l’aéro qui a exprimé comment il aurait pu mieux faire les choses à l’époque…
– CyberInflight cité par nos amis de Aerospace Corporation pour notre contribution au framework SPARTA Merci Brandon Bailey !
– La White House appelle à une harmonisation de la réglementation cyber
– Server status : un des challenge de hack-a-sat. Il y a un leak de pointeur sur cette page (que vous pouvez voir) et qui a donné un indice aux équipes sur la façon de procéder
– Synthèse de 4 derniers hack-a-sat
– Ambiance électrique lors du dernier jour
The evolution of SPARTA is a perfect illustration of how the cyber domain is increasingly taking into account the specificities of the space domain. This adaptation is carried out through multiple publications by NIST, MITRE and others. SPARTA is at the forefront of this trend and continues to include new elements to facilitate its use.
1- TTP Notional Risk Scores
Two objectives:
To establish the likelihood of an attack due to the uniqueness of every mission and system implementation.
To illustrate adversary capability which contributes to the likelihood that an actor can execute certain SPARTA TTPs.
In order to produce an analysis on the TTPs potential impact, this results in a NOTIONAL risk determination with three notional risk values sorted by system/mission criticality (high, medium, low).
2- ISO 27001 Mapping
SPARTA is adapting to other regional contexts and rules. This mapping was performed using NIST’s published mapping between NIST 800–53 rev5 and ISO 270001.
3- D3FEND Technique and Artifact Mappings
SPARTA aims to provide a translation/mapping of D3FEND (Denial, and Disruption Framework Empowering Network Defense) techniques from MITRE and artifacts to the relevant SPARTA countermeasures. This should enable users of SPARTA to bridge the gap between countermeasures/courses of actions (COAs).
4- Additional References
In SPARTA version 1.3.2, over 20 TTP references were updated using CyberInflight’s Market Intelligence Team’s space attack database. In version 1.4, the integration of our data has been fully completed. Approximately 50 attacks were added to the appropriate techniques/sub-techniques under the reference section for each TTP.
Roughly 60% of the attacks that we provided fall within the Reconnaissance and Resource Development tactics, which is a precursor to almost all attacks. This reinforces how important the Protect Sensitive Information countermeasure is because threat actors are actively extracting sensitive design information. In some cases, threat actors’ objectives are simply Exfiltration or Theft, and these attacks could be achieving their objective simply by stealing the information.
For more information, don’t hesitate to check the DEFCON31 presentation and SPARTA
Source: https://medium.com/the-aerospace-corporation/sparta-v1-4-whats-new-1ecdbf4873d7
#satellite #cybersecurity #cybersécurité #space
Dans la démesure, le show à l’américaine où Elvis nous vend des produits de cybersécurité
Des démonstrations de hacking, de lock-picking, d’électronique mais surtout des discours marketing ultra-rodés où tous les moyens sont bons pour s’assurer que vous n’oublierez pas leur entreprise : distribution de goodies, de paires de chaussettes, de figurines APT, de tee-shirt et casquettes imprimés avec votre tête générée par une IA, autres concours de jeux vidéos, de rubix cube et même des massage du dos !
#blackhat #cyberinflight
In late July, a hacker going by the name “samurai” and associated with the group “SecDet” claimed to have gained access to several hashtag#satellites, including CBERS-2/B, GLS-LANDSAT, and LANDSAT-1/7. These accesses were allegedly obtained by exploiting vulnerabilities in the INPE (National Institute for Space Research) in Brazil. The hacker’s claim was detailed on their website, where they outlined their malicious actions against databases and servers belonging to INPE.
Cyberattacks targeting the space sector
CyberInflight conducts data collection and analysis of cyberattacks targeting the space sector. This data is included in our attacks database, which is available for purchase.
For more information regarding this database or our economic intelligence report on the cybersecurity space market, feel free to contact us at the following email address: research@cyberinflight.com
#satellite #cybersecurity #space
On June 28-29, 2023, a series of messages on a Telegram channel claimed a large-scale cyber attack against Dozor-Teleport. Along with the claim messages, numerous files to download, an audio recording, and several screenshots were made available. The attacker(s) claimed affiliation with the Wagner Group without providing any additional evidence.
The information was first picked up on Twitter by pro-Ukrainian accounts. It quickly leaked to numerous cybersecurity news sites worldwide. Within 12 hours, major news outlets such as The Washington Post reported the information. Within 24 hours, the information was present on a range of media platforms.
During this dissemination, the information underwent a true game of “Chinese whispers.” The initial articles simply reproduced the information as it was published on Twitter or Telegram, barely mentioning that it was what the attackers claimed. Subsequently, various media outlets started amplifying the information. Headlines suggested that a Russian military hashtag#satellite network had been hacked before articles began appearing about hacked Russian military communication satellites.
In general, several issues continue to arise regarding the treatment of information about attacks in the space domain:
1️Once the word “satellite” is mentioned, the information suddenly gains interest in terms of cybersecurity. The reason is simple: the combination of space and cyber can quickly evoke fascination. The downside is that sensationalist headlines often multiply.
There is a clear lack of perspective regarding information related to cyberattacks. The need to be the first to publish information (which is understandable) leads to approximate or poorly verified information spreading rapidly.
The study and questioning of sources are rarely emphasized. Many press articles simply republish what has already been said without verifying the primary source of the information. As a result, basic information quickly becomes considered as true. For example, based on a given analysis on Twitter, it has been repeated by numerous media outlets that it was the first attack on a satellite provider since Viasat, which is false.
In the era of OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence), the amount of available information is considerable, but there is a lack of necessary reflection for understanding the information. Consequently, certain major cyberattacks that occurred over a year ago, such as the Viasat hashtag#attack, remain particularly vague in both their execution and impact.
#spacecybersecurity #satellite #cyber
